1) For any proposition p, knowledge of p is valuable.
2) If knowledge of a proposition is valuable, then that proposition ought to be known.
3) Ought implies can.
4) Therefore, for any proposition p, p can be known.
(4) actually implies the existence of an omniscient being. Take some proposition q that is only true in the actual world. According to (4), there is some possible world where someone knows q. But which possible world does this person who knows q occupy? Well, since the only possible world that q is true in is the actual world, this person is in the actual world! Now let r be whatever proposition you want. We can run this same argument with the conjunction of q and r, So, there is a being in the actual world which knows the conjunction of q and r.
From this point, we have two routes we can take:
-Let r be the conjunction of all true propositions. Does such a proposition exist? Probably not. But if it does, then there's a being who knows all true propositions.
-Argue on the basis of parsimony that we should posit one being that knows all truths, rather than infinity beings that each knows a single proposition.
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ReplyDeleteDoes 1) not entail that for any proposition p, knowledge of p is possible? If for a proposition p, knowledge of p was impossible then knowledge of p would not be valuable as impossibilities cannot be valuable. So, it seems that 1) does entail the following principle: For any proposition p, knowledge of p is possible. But the atheist then would simply reject 1) as they would reject the possibility of knowing all propositions. To accept 1) we would need a reason to think that knowledge of all propositions is possible. But, this is the conclusion of the argument. So, you would have to already accept the conclusion of the argument to accept the first premise. This is a major flaw with many ontological arguments for God’s existence. The skeptic is asked to accept a premise they believe is metaphysically impossible without sufficient justification. Such arguments are therefore “dialectically toothless”.
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